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Abstract
The paper presents the newly developed dynamic spatial general equilibrium model of Eu-
ropean Commission, RHOMOLO. The model incorporates several elements from economic
geography in a novel and theoretically consistent way. It describes the location choice of
different types of agents and captures the interplay between agglomeration and dispersion
forces in determining the spatial equilibrium. The model is also dynamic as it allows for
the accumulation of factors of production, human capital and technology. This makes RHO-
MOLO well suited for simulating policy scenario related to the EU cohesion policy and for
the analysis of its impact on the regions and the Member States of the union.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Why developing a new model?
For years, the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Com-
mission had used economic models for analysing the impact of cohesion policy programmes.
In particular, DG REGIO extensively relied on two models for the simulation of scenar-
ios related to cohesion policy: HERMIN and QUEST. HERMIN was initially developed
by scholars in the 1980’s and has been regularly upgraded since then. QUEST is the
model developed and used by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
(Varga and in ’t Veld, 2011). It adopts the most recent practices in DSGE modelling, which
is notably reflected in its high level of micro-foundations.
However, given that both these models produce results at the national level, it was felt
that DG REGIO should extend its analytical capacities to also cover the regional level.
After an in-depth literature review, it appeared that none of the existing models could fully
respond to the need of DG REGIO which hence decided to develop its own regional model.
The objective was to build a dynamic spatial general equilibrium model which would
be suited for analysing the impact of cohesion policy at the NUTS 2 level, i.e. the most
relevant geographical level for the policy.1 In order to cover the needs of DG REGIO, the
model had to include several features. In particular, since cohesion policy mostly supports
investments aiming at fostering economic growth in EU regions, the model should be well
suited to capture the impact of the policy on the main engines of endogenous growth. At
the same time, it should account for local specificities which may affect the dynamics of the
regional economies (factor endowment, accessibility, etc.).
Finally, the model should incorporate regional linkages in the line of New Economic Ge-
ography and be capable of simulating the impact of policy shocks on the spatial equilibrium.
Accordingly, the model should incorporate various agglomeration and dispersion forces as
well as other possible sources of spatial spill-over and interdependencies.
First, a prototype of the model was elaborated by a private consultant (TNO) contracted
by DG REGIO.2 The prototype was then passed on to DG REGIO and Directorate General
Join Research Centre (DG JRC) which developed a dynamic spatial general equilibrium
model covering the EU-27 at NUTS 2 level. The model has been named RHOMOLO,
standing for Regional HOlistic MOdeL.
1In some cases, NUTS 2 regions are relatively small (like for instance some German La¨nders) and the
NUTS 1 level was then considered as more appropriate.
2See Ferrara et al. (2010) for a formal description of the prototype model.
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1.2. Main features of RHOMOLO
The domestic economy (which corresponds to the EU) consists of R−1 regions r =
1, . . . , R−1, which are included into M countries m = 1, . . . ,M . Each region is inhab-
ited by Hr households which are immobile. They partly determine the size of the regional
market.3 The income of households consists in labour revenue (wages), capital revenue and
government transfers. It is used to consume final goods, pay taxes and accumulate savings.
The final goods sector includes s = 1, . . . , S different economic sectors in which firms
operate under monopolistic competition a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each firm produces
a differentiated variety which is considered as an imperfect substitute to the other by house-
holds and firms. The number of firms in sector s and region r is denoted by Ns,r. It is large
enough so that strategic interactions between firms is negligible. Goods are either consumed
by households or used by other firms as intermediate inputs or as investment goods. The
number of firms in each region is endogenous and to a large extent determines the spatial
distribution of economic activity.
The rest of the world is introduced in the model as a particular region (indexed by R)
and particular sector (indexed by S). Sector S differs from domestic sectors in that it only
has one variety which is exclusively produced in region R. Formally, we have NS,r = 0 and
Ns,R = 0 for all r and s; and NS,R = 1. The foreign variety of final goods is used as the
numeraire.
Trade between (and within) regions is costly, implying that the shipping of goods between
(and within) regions entails transport costs which are assumed to be of the iceberg type, with
τs,r,q > 1 representing the quantity of sector’s s goods which needs to be sent from region r
in order to have one unit arriving in region q (see for instance Krugman (1991)). Transport
costs are assumed to be identical across varieties but specific to sectors and trading partners.
They are related to the distance separating regions r and q but can also depend on other
factors, such as transport infrastructure or national borders. Finally, transport costs can be
asymmetric (i.e. τs,r,q may differ from τs,q,r). They are also assumed to be positive within a
given region (i.e. τs,r,r 6= 1) which captures, among others, the distance between customers
and firms within the region.
The description of technological change directly follows Romer (1990) and Jones (1995).
In their production process, final goods firms use durable goods. Each variety of durable
goods is produced by a specific (durable goods) firm and traded on a regional market whose
3Labour mobility can be introduced through a module which extends this core version of the model with
a more sophisticated specification of the labour market. This is described in Brandsma et al. (2014).
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structure is monopolistic competition. In order to start operating, each durable goods
firm must acquire a design from a research sector which uses human capital and existing
knowledge to produce new designs.
The structure of the labour market is also monopolistic competition. Each household
supplies a specific variety of low, medium and high skilled labour services to firms which
are considered as imperfect substitutes to the ones offered by other households. Changing
wages is assumed to be costly which introduces nominal wage rigidity in the model.4
Finally, in each country there is a public sector which levies taxes on consumption and on
the income of local households. It provides public goods in the form of public capital which
is necessary for the operation of firms. It also subsidises the private sector, including the
production of R&D and innovation, and influences the capacity of the educational system
to produce human capital.
The detailed regional and sectoral dimensions of RHOMOLO implies that the number
of (non-linear) equations to be solved simultaneously is relatively high. Therefore, in order
to keep the model manageable from a computation point of view, its dynamics is kept
relatively simple. Three types of factors (physical capital, human capital and knowledge
capital) as well as three types of assets (equities, domestic government bonds and foreign
bonds) are accumulated between periods. Agents are assumed to save a constant fraction of
their income each period and to form their expectations based only on the current and past
states of the economy. The dynamics of the model is then described as in a standard Solow
model, i.e. a sequence of static sub-models that are linked between periods by the laws of
motion determining the time path of some key stock variables.
The model includes several agglomeration and dispersion forces determining the location
choice of firms. Those include backward (firms prefer to have good access to output mar-
kets) and forward linkages (firms prefer to have good access to input markets) as well as
Marshallian technological spill-over. Dispersion forces relate to competition on the goods
market as well as competition for local labour.
This paper aims at presenting the theoretical specifications underlying RHOMOLO in
order to document and clarify the main assumptions and micro-founded mechanisms it
contains. Section 2 details the behaviour of households while section 3 focuses on firms in
4Assuming monopolistic competition both on the goods and the labour markets is in line with models
such as Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Such specification allows to focus both on price and wage decisions
and in particular to introduce nominal rigidities in the model. In addition, as underlined by Manning (2010),
monopolistic competition is a very simple manner to capture the idea of thick labour markets, namely that
the high density of workers raises productivity, thereby making large labour markets more attractive for
firms. This enriches the the description of the economic geography in the mode.
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the final goods sector. It also describes how the interplay between the R&D and the durable
goods sector leads to technological progress. Section 4 is devoted to the public sector and
explains how policy interventions are introduced in the model. Section 5 lays down the
conditions to clear the product, labour and financial markets and elaborates on the notion
of spatial equilibrium in the model. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2. Households
Households make decisions about consumption, savings and labour supply. Each house-
hold supplies a differentiated variety of labour which contains a low, medium and high
skilled component. Let e = lo,me, hi denote the low-, medium- and high-skilled component
respectively. Preference of households is represented by a utility function which is additively
separable in consumption and leisure:
U
(
Ch,q;
∑
e=lo,me,hi
V (1− lh,e,q)
)
= Ch,q +
∑
e=lo,me,hi
V (1− lh,e,q)
where Ch,q is the consumption of final goods by household h in region q is and lh,e,q is the
labour of type e it supplies. We assume that the sub-utility with respect to leisure takes the
form of a CES with a standard labour supply elasticity (κ) and a skill specific weight (ωe)
on leisure in order to capture differences in participation to the labour market between skill
groups. We have ∑
e
V (1− lh,e,q) =
∑
e
ωe
1− κ
(1− lh,e,q)
1−κ
The budget constraint of household h, q can be written as
P cqCh,q ≤ (1− s) Y Ch,q (1)
where P cq is the price of final goods in region q, Y Ch,q is disposable income and s is the
constant saving rate which is common to all households.
Disposable income is the sum of labour and capital income net of wage adjustment cost
plus government transfers net of taxes:
Y Ch,q =
∑
e
(1− twm)wh,e,q lh,e,q − Γw(wh,e,q) + (1− t
pi
m)KIh,q +
TRH,m∑Rm
r=1Hr
where wh,e,q is the wage paid to household h, q for its skill level e, KIh,q is capital income,
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and TRH,m denotes government transfers to households in country m.Γw(wh,e,q) denotes the
wage adjustment cost (see below).
Capital income corresponds to the returns linked to the holding of three different types
of assets: equities (i.e. liability against the durable goods firms in the R−1 regions of the
domestic economy), domestic bonds (i.e. liability against theM governments of the domestic
economy) and foreign bonds (i.e. liability against the rest of the world). Let Bk,v,rh,q , B
G,m
h,q ,
BFh,q denote the stock of these assets held by the household respectively in firm v of region
r, in government bonds of country m and in foreign bonds. The associated returns are
respectively rkv,r, r
G
m, r
F . The holding of equities also gives right to a share of the durable
goods firms profit. Finally, we assume that the firms in the final goods sector are also owned
by households who share their profits. Capital income then reads
KIh,q =
R−1∑
r=1
Ar∑
v=1
rkv,rB
k,v,r
h,q +
M∑
m=1
rGmB
G,m
h,q + r
FBFh,q +
R−1∑
r=1
Ar∑
v=1
sk,v,rh,q piv,r +
1
H
piFG (2)
where Ar is the number of durable goods firms in region r, piv,r is the profit of the durable
goods firm v in region r, H =
∑R−1
r=1 Hr is the domestic population and pi
FG is the sum of
profits of the final goods sector. sk,v,rh,q = B
k,v,r
h,q /av,r is the share of total assets issued by firm
v, r (av,r) held by the household. Except for H , these variables are endogenous and their
determination is described in the next sections of the paper.
Finally, wages are subject to convex adjustment cost:
Γw(wh,e,q) =
∑
e
γw
2
lh,e,q
∆w2h,e,q
wh,e,q
The optimisation problem of the household is solved by maximising the associated La-
grangian
L = Ch,q +
∑
e
ωe
1− κ
(1− lh,e,q)
1−κ − λ
(
P cq Ch,q − (1− s) Y Ch,q
)
(3)
with respect to consumption, Ch,q, and labour supply, lh,e,q.
2.1. Consumption
First order conditions to that optimisation problem imply that the aggregate consump-
tion level is directly related to disposable income:
Ch,q =
(1− s) Y Ch,q
P cq
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Households consume all varieties of final goods available in the economy. In order to
represent love for varieties, Ch,q is assumed to take the form of a CES sub-utility function
defined as5
Ch,q =
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
(
ci,s,rh,q
)θ) 1θ
(4)
where ci,s,rh,q is the consumption of variety i of sector s produced in regions r and βs is the
weight given to sector s in the household’s preference.6
Household h, q chooses a consumption bundle in order to maximise (4) subject to the
following constraint:
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
τs,r,q
(
1 + tcs,m
)
pi,s,r c
i,s,r
h,q = (1− s) Y Ch,q
where pi,s,r is the price of variety i,s,r, τs,r,q is trade cost from region r to region q, and t
c
s,m
is the tax rate applied to consumption of sector s goods in country m (where region q is
assumed to be located).
The price of variety S,R produced in the rest of the world is assumed to be exogenous
to the domestic economy, i.e. pS,R = p¯S,R. We also assume that foreign households have
the same type of preference regarding domestic goods and that the share of their disposable
income devoted to the consumption of domestic goods is fixed.
Solving this problem leads to the following demand for variety i,s,r:
ci,s,rh,q =
(
τs,r,q
(
1 + tcs,m
)
pi,s,r
βsP cq
) 1
θ−1
(1− s) Y Ch,q
P cq
(5)
where P cq is the following CES price index:
P cq =
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
β
1
1−θ
s (τs,r,q
(
1 + tcs,m
)
pi,s,r)
θ
θ−1
) θ−1
θ
(6)
5Distribution parameters are introduced in the CES in order to calibrate the model (see for instance
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) or Balistreri et al. (2011)). These parameters are not included here for
the sake of simplicity.
6The model as coded incorporates a nested CES utility function to allow for different elasticities of
substitution between varieties of a given sector on the one hand and sectors on the other hand. This feature
is not introduced here to simplify notations.
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According to (5), demand for variety i, s, r is a fraction of real income spent on final
goods. This fraction decreases with the relative price of this variety, the relevant transport
cost and tax rate, while it increases with relative preference for sector s.
2.2. Labour supply
Each household decides which fraction of its time endowment will be devoted to leisure
on the one hand and to labour in each types of skill on the other hand. Labour markets are
characterised by monopolistic competition where, within each skill group, labour supplied
by a particular household corresponds to a variety which is an imperfect substitute to the
others. Maximising (3) with respect to lh,e,q, we obtain the following wage setting rule:
ωe (1− lh,e,q)
−κ 1
η
= (1− twm)
wh,e,q
P cq
(7)
with
η =
[
σ (1− s)−
γw (σ − 1) pi
w
h,e,q
(1− twm)
]
The real wage is set as a mark-up, 1
η
, over the reservation wage (i.e. the marginal utility
of leisure divided by the marginal utility of consumption). The mark-up depends on the
elasticity of substitution between the different varieties of labour in the firms production
function, σ (see below). Because adjusting wages is costly, the mark-up also depends on the
level of wage inflation, piwh,e,q = ∆wh,e,q/wh,e,q, which implies that wages only adjust slowly
to variation in prices.
It is further assumed that the household accumulates skill specific human capital, bh,e,q,
according to
∆bh,e,q = bh,e,q(e
Λ
h,e,q − 1)− δHC bh,e,q, (8)
allowing to offer bh,e,q efficiency units. Λ represents the amount of time a household
spends on education while δHC is the depreciation rate for human capital.
3. Firms
3.1. Final goods firms
Final goods firms produce horizontally differentiated varieties of final goods. The final
goods sector is characterised by monopolistic competition. It includes S sectors in which
each firm produces a variety which is an imperfect substitute to the others. The production
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function firms is of the Leontieff type. The arguments are the quantities of intermediate
inputs bought from all sectors and a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the factors used in the
production process, i.e. labour and durable goods:
Xi,s,r = min{yi,s,r, a
1
sX
1
i,s,r, . . . , a
u
sX
u
i,s,r, . . . , a
S
sX
S
i,s,r} (9)
where Xi,s,r is the quantity produced by the firm producing variety i of sector s located in
region r , yi,s,r is its value added, X
u
i,s,r is an index of the intermediate inputs from sector u
and aus the associated technical coefficient, assumed to be common to all firms in sector s
in country m, independently of their location within the country. The index Xui,s,r is a CES
aggregate of varieties produced in sector u:
Xui,s,r =
(
R∑
q=1
Nu,q∑
j=1
(
xj,u,qi,s,r
)θ) 1θ
with θ ∈ (0, 1).
The firm’s value added is a Cobb-Douglas of the two factors used in the production
process:
yi,s,r = Z
αs
i,s,r L
1−αs
i,s,r KG
αG
r − FCi,s,r (10)
where Zi,s,r and Li,s,r are CES aggregates of the varieties of durable goods and of the various
types of labour –low-, medium- and high-skilled– used by the firm.7 Let KGr denote the
stock of public capital available in region r which is assumed to affect positively total factor
productivity.8 The firm also supports a fixed cost, FCi,s,r, made of some of the firm’s value
added. 9 Finally, it benefits from subsidies of the national government (Subi,s,rm ) and of the
EU (Subi,s,rEU ).
Durable goods and labour are assumed to be spatially immobile which implies that firms
in regions r can only obtain those two factors on the local market. Moreover, we assume that
durable goods are not subject to internal transport costs (i.e. τZ,r,r = 1). The respective
7The firm uses effective units of labour which includes both physical units of labour and the associated
human capital.
8Note that according to this specification, each firm can benefit from the whole stock of public capital
available in the region where it is located. This reflects the public good nature of public capital and in
particular that it is non-rivalrous. We also assume it is non-excludable in that its use by firms does not
incur direct payment but only indirect ones (the provision of pubic capital is financed by taxes) which are
not internalised by the firm.
9The model also incorporates a fixed cost in terms of labour. It is not included here in order to simplify
the presentation.
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CES indices read
Zi,s,r =
(
Ar∑
v=1
(zv,ri,s,r)
ρ
) 1
ρ
Li,s,r =
( ∑
e=lo,me,hi
γe
Hr∑
h=1
(bh,e,r l
h,e,r
i,s,r )
σ
) 1
σ
where ρ, σ ∈ (0, 1). Factor γe accounts for difference in labour productivity between low,
medium and skilled labour, with γlo < γme < γhi.
Profit maximisation leads the firm to set the output price as a mark-up over marginal
cost, where the mark-up depends on the elasticity of the total demand it faces. This includes
demand from households, from other firms for intermediate inputs, from durable goods firms
for investment goods and from the government. Given our assumptions concerning the
preferences of these agents and the CES aggregates for intermediate inputs and for physical
capital (see below), the elasticity of total demand is 1/(θ − 1) and the price-making rule is
pi,s,r =
MCi,s,r
θ
(11)
The marginal cost includes the cost of production factors and the cost of intermediate
inputs:
MCi,s,r = P
y
i,s,r +
S∑
u=1
aus · P
u
i,s,r
where P yi,s,r is the price of value added. Given the specification adopted for valued added,
P yi,s,r is common to all firms in sector s and region r and corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas of
the factors’ price:
P yi,s,r = KG
−αG
r ·
(
P zi,s,r
αs
)αs
·
(
Wi,s,r
1− αs
)1−αs
P ui,sr, P
z
i,sr and Wi,s,r are the price indices corresponding to the CES aggregates respectively
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of intermediate inputs, durable goods and labour varieties:
P ui,s,r =
(
R∑
q=1
Nu,q∑
j=1
(τu,q,r pj,u,q)
θ
θ−1
) θ−1
θ
(12)
P zi,s,r =
(
Ar∑
v=1
pzv,r
ρ
ρ−1
) ρ−1
ρ
(13)
Wi,s,r =
( ∑
e=lo,me,hi
Jr∑
h=1
b
σ
1−σ
h,e,rw
σ
σ−1
h,e,r
)σ−1
σ
(14)
where pj,u,q is the price of variety j, u, q of final goods, p
z
v,r is the price of variety v, r of
durable goods and wh,r,e is the wage of household h, r for his labour service of skill e.
We assume symmetry across firms (resp. households) in terms of the technology (resp.
preferences) which implies that the price (resp. wage) set by each firm (resp. household)
within one given region is the same. Accordingly, one easily verifies that P ui,s,r = P
u
r for all
i, s, P zi,s,r = P
z
r for all i, s, Wi,s,r = Wr for all i, s, and P
y
i,s,r = P
y
s,r for all i. Note that we
also that consumption taxes do not apply to intermediate inputs.
The demand of the firm for each variety of intermediate inputs, durable goods and labour
then take the following form, respectively:
xj,u,qi,s,r =
(
τu,q,r pj,u,q
P ur
) 1
θ−1
Xui,s,r (15)
zv,ri,s,r =
(
pv,r
P zr
) 1
ρ−1
Zi,s,r (16)
lh,e,ri,s,r =
(
wh,e,r
bσh,e,rWr
) 1
σ−1
Li,s,r (17)
3.2. National R&D sectors
There are M national R&D sectors which produce new designs ∆Jm using all varieties
of skilled labour available on the national labour market. The production process features
learning by doing, as labour productivity is positively related to the pre-existing stock of
designs. There are international technological spill-overs in the sense that the national R&D
sector absorbs part of the technology produced within the M countries. Finally, the R&D
sector is supported by the national government and the EU which provide subsidies, SubR&Dm
and SubR&DEU , proportional to the production of new designs. Following Romer (1990), the
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production function of the R&D sector of country m reads
∆Jm = (J
∗)ω · Jζm · L
hi
R&D,m ω, ζ < 1
where J∗ is the stock of design in the M economies and LR&D,m is a CES aggregate of the
national skilled labour varieties
LR&D,m =
(
Rm∑
r=1
Hr∑
h=1
(bh,hi,r l
h,hi,r
R&D )
σ
) 1
σ
Finally, designs are assumed to become obsolete after one period (i.e. the depreciation
rate on designs is set to 1) which implies that firms must renew their licences every year to
continue using the updated versions of the designs. 10
Perfect competition prevails on each national market for designs and firms maximise
profit by choosing the level of new designs and the corresponding quantity of skilled labour
employed in each variety:
∆Jm =
(
Ω ·
PJ,m + Sub
R&D
m ++Sub
R&D
EU
WR&D,m
) ǫ
1−ǫ
where Ω = D∗ω ·Dm
φ, PJ,m is the price of new designs and WR&D,m is the CES wage index
for the R&D sector:
WR&D,m =
(
Rm∑
r=1
Hr∑
h=1
(bh,hi,r wh,hi,r)
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ
.
Note that given the constant return to scale technology of the R&D sector, the average
cost corresponds to the marginal cost and there is no profit at equilibrium, even in the short
run. Moreover, as we assumed that new designs were only used for one period, the R&D
sector does not benefit from rents or royalties.
The demand of the R&D sector for each variety of highly skilled labour from region q
then takes the following form:
10In fact, this assumption is adopted in order to avoid introducing inter-temporal decisions in the model
and hence keep the description of its dynamics simple.
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lh,hi,rR&D =
(
wh,hi,r
bσh,hi,rWR&D,m
) 1
σ−1
LR&D,m (18)
3.3. Durable goods firms
Durable goods firms use the output of national R&D firms and supply inputs to final
goods firms. In order to start operating, the firm v in the durable goods sector of region r
must acquire one design and transform it into a new production process. The firm can only
obtain designs from its national R&D sector by buying a licence which must be renewed
each period. Production also entails a fixed cost denoted by FCv,r. Finally, the firm receives
subsidies from the national government (Subv,rm ) and of the EU (Sub
v,r
EU). It operates under
monopolistic competition and produces one variety of durable goods using physical capital.
The production function is:
zv,r = Kv,r (19)
Capital is financed by selling assets av,r to households on the M national financial mar-
kets, which implies that av,r = P
k
rKv,r, with P
k
r being the price of physical capital. Asset
av,r yields a gross return r
k
v,r P
k
r which corresponds to the rental price for one unit of capital.
We assume capital to depreciate at a rate δK . This in fact corresponds to the mobile capital
framework of Martin and Rogers (1995) which assumes that (i) capital is mobile between
regions and (ii) the revenue of capital is repatriated to the owner’s region.
Each unit of capital is a CES aggregate of varieties of final goods bought in all regions:
Kv,r =
(
R∑
q=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,q∑
i=1
(ki,s,qv,r )
θ
) 1
θ
(20)
This index is equivalent to the one representing preferences of households which implies
that price of capital is equal to the consumer price index, i.e. P kr = P
c
r . Importantly, note
that the price of capital is region-specific. This reflects the fact that varieties constituting
physical capital must partly be imported. Given the existence of transport cost, physical
capital is more costly in small/peripheral regions.
Transforming designs into an effective new production process is uncertain. We denote
the probability to succeed in using a new design by φ. In order to capture the empirically well-
documented fact that the capacity of a region to innovate depends on its technological level
and the skills embodied in its human capital (see for instance Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi
(2008)), we assume that φ depends on the existing stock of operational processes which also
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corresponds to the number of durable goods firms, Ar, and its stock of human capital, HCr:
φr =
(
Ar∑Rm
r=1Ar
)ν (
HCr∑Rm
r=1HCr
)1−ν
. (21)
The regional stock of human capital is defined as the number of effective units of high skilled
labour available in region r, i.e HCr =
∑Hr
h=1 bh,hi,r lh,hi,r.
The expected profit of the durable goods firm then reads
piv,r = φr
[
pzv,r zv,r − r
k
v,r P
c
rKv,r − PJ,m − FCv,r + Sub
v,r
m + Sub
v,r
EU
]
(22)
Profit maximisation under the constraint (19) leads the durable goods firm to address
the following demand for each variety of final goods:
ki,s,qv,r =
(
τs,q,r
(
1 + tcs,m
)
pi,s,q
βs · P cr
) 1
θ−1
Kv,r (23)
The firm also sets its price as a mark-up over marginal cost with
pv,r =
MCv,r
θ
(24)
where MCv,r = r
k
v,rP
c
r . This implies that production of the durable goods firm and hence
its demand for capital depends negatively on the rental price of capital and positively on
the demand addressed to the firm (accelerator mechanism). Investment corresponds to the
variation in the stock of capital plus depreciation:
Iv,r = ∆Kv,r + δK Kv,r
It is financed by the issuance of new assets, i.e. P cr Iv,r = ∆av,r.
Note that, given the form of the production function (19) adopted for the durable goods
sector, the production function of a final goods firm reads
yi,s,r = A
αs/ρ
r K
αs
i,s,r L
1−αs
i,s,r KG
αG
r − FCi,s,r (25)
i.e. the volume of output depends of the use of capital (embodied in the durable goods)
and labour. As in Romer (1990), it also depends on technological change which takes the
form of an increase in the the range of durable goods the firms have access to. This range is
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endogenous and determined by the market conditions faced by durable goods firms, among
which the number of final goods firms on the regional market and the performance of the
national R&D sector.
4. Public sector
4.1. Government
We assume a multi-level governance framework where the national government interacts
with the EU level. The expenditure of the national government of country m consists in
consumption of final goods GCm, transfers to households TRH,m, subsidies to firms Subm,
and government investment GIm. These components of government expenditure are all
assumed to be fixed at exogenous levels, although they can serve as variables for modelling
policy shocks.
Let Gm denote the sum of government consumption and investment. We assume gov-
ernment consumption and investment to be distributed among the regions of country m
according to the shares of the population. The regional government also receives resources
from the EU which we denote by TREU,q. The amount of public consumption and investment
taking place in region q (assumed to be in country m) then reads11
Gq =
Hq
Hm
·Gm + TREU,q
Analogously to households and firms, the regional governments have CES preference
defined over the set of varieties produced in the domestic economy and abroad. We have
Gq =
(
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
βs
Ns,r∑
i=1
(
ci,s,rG,q
)θ) 1θ
The demand addressed by the public sector of region q to firm i, s, r is then
ci,s,rG,q =
(
τs,r,q
(
1 + tcs,m
)
pi,s,r
βsP cq
) 1
θ−1
Gq (26)
11Note that by limiting public consumption and investment in a given region to the allocation of resources
received from the central government and the EU, we rule out the possibility for regional governments to
finance their expenditure by raising their own taxes or issuing their own debt.
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The government contributes to the EU budget and in particular to cohesion policy fund-
ing, CPF , proportionally to its weight in the EU GDP:
TRm,EU =
GDPm
GDP
CPF
where GDPm =
∑Rm
r=1GDPr and GDP =
∑
mGDPm. GDPr is GDP of region r and is
defined in the next section.
The government levies taxes on consumption as well as on capital and labour income
which constitutes its revenues:
Tm =
Rm∑
q=1
Hq
R∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
tcs,mNs,r pi,s,r τr,q,s c
i,s,r
h,q
+ twm
(
Rm∑
q=1
∑
e=lo,me,hi
Hq∑
h=1
wh,e,q lh,e,q
)
+ tpim
Rm∑
q=1
HqKIh,q
The public deficit in country m is the difference between government expenditure, in-
cluding interests on the outstanding debt, and revenue:
Dm =
Rm∑
q=1
P cq Gq + TRH,m + TRm,EU + r
G
mBG,m + Subm − Tm −
Rm∑
q=1
TREU,q
where BG,m and Subm are respectively the public debt and government subsidies in country
m, with12
Subm =
Rm∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Ns,r Sub
i,s,r
m + Sub
R&D
m +
Rm∑
r=1
ArSub
v,r
EU
Finally, the stock of public capital in region q increases with the level of public investment
of the regional government and decreases with depreciation:
∆KGq = GIq − δK KGq
12This formulation does not prejudge how subsidies change with the number of firms. According to the
policy scenario envisaged, the total amount of subsidies could increase/remain constant with the number of
firms while subsidies allocated to individual firms remain constant/decrease with the number of firms.
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4.2. Modelling policy intervention
In order to model the European cohesion policy (ECP) interventions, we regroup the
different ECP expenditure categories into 5 broader groups of policy instruments (see Table
1). R&D related policy measures are modelled as subsidies (SubR&DEU,q ) reducing fixed costs in
the R&D sector. Policy instruments aimed at increasing human capital are modelled as an
education investment in skill-specific human capital, Λe and increases public consumption in
the regions benefiting from the intervention. Transport infrastructure investments are mod-
elled as a reduction of trade costs, τs,r,q. Other infrastructure investments are implemented
in RHOMOLO as an increase of the stock of public capital, KGr. These interventions also
increase the level of public consumption. ECP policy measure affecting particular indus-
tries or services are modelled as government subsidies reducing fixed costs in the final goods
and/or in the durable goods sector (SubFGEU,q and Sub
z
EU,q). Finally, technical assistance is
assumed to increase government consumption.
Table 1: Modelling of policy intervention in RHOMOLO
Field Implementation in Rhomolo Variables
RTD Reduction of fixed costs in R&D sector SubR&DEU,q
Human resources Education investment in skill-specific human capital Λe, TREU,q
Infrastructure Reduction of trade costs τs,q,r, TREU,q
Increase of the stock of public capital KGq, TREU,q
Industry and services Reduction of fixed costs in final goods sector FCi,s,q, Sub
FG
EU,q
Reduction of fixed costs in durable goods sector FCv,q, Sub
z
EU,q
Technical assistance Increase in public consumption TREU,q
Notes: The presented policy interventions are illustrative. Many more policy instruments and their combinations can be
implemented in RHOMOLO.
In order to translate the impact of a particular policy measure on the model variables, we
make use when relevant of complementary models or employ estimates from the literature.
For example, in order to simulate the TEN-T investments in transport infrastructure, the
improvements in the transport network due to transport infrastructure investments are first
simulated with the transport model TRANSTOOLS, where the units of measurement are
kilometres of new infrastructure, number of additional lanes, maximum speed, etc. In a
second step, the impact of the changes in the accessibility of regions on economic variables
is simulated with RHOMOLO, where the units of measurement are relative prices, wages,
employment, GDP, etc.
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In addition to supply-side effects, the ECP interventions have also demand-side effects
(see listed in Table 1). Both the demand and supply side effects together with the induced
general equilibrium effects determine the net policy impact and hence all are important
for policy incidence. The demand-side effects are implemented as additional government
expenditure of final demand and investments goods.
5. Market equilibrium and closure rules
5.1. Goods, labour and innovation markets
All households and all firms within a given sector are assumed to be symmetric, which
implies that in a specific regions r wages and quantities consumed are identical for all
households while prices and quantities produced are identical for all firms.
The firm i, s, r faces demand from four types of agents: households (domestic and foreign)
Di,s,rH , firms of the final goods sector D
i,s,r
F , firms of the durable goods sector D
i,s,r
K and the
domestic public sector Di,s,rG :
Di,s,rH =
R∑
q=1
Hq c
i,s,r
h,q
Di,s,rF =
S∑
u=1
R∑
q=1
Nu,q x
i,s,r
j,u,q
Di,s,rK =
R−1∑
q=1
Aq k
i,s,r
v,q
Di,s,rG =
R−1∑
q=1
ci,s,rG,q
where ci,s,rh,q , x
i,s,r
j,u,q, k
i,s,r
v,q and c
i,s,r
G,q are respectively given by equations (5), (15), (23) and
(26). The four components of total demand feature the same price elasticity and the firm
sets its price, pi,s,r, according to the rule given by equation (11), thereby equating demand
and supply:
Xi,s,r = D
i,s,r
H +D
i,s,r
F +D
i,s,r
K +D
i,s,r
G
GDP of region r then corresponds to
∑S
s=1Ns,r · P
y
i,s,r · yi,s,r =
∑S
s=1Ns,r · P
y
i,s,r ·Xi,s,r.
In region q, Hq different varieties of low, medium and high skilled labour are supplied on
the labour market. Labour supply of skill level e by on household h in region q, denoted as
lh,e,q is given by equation (7).
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Labour demand stems from the final goods sector on the one hand and from the national
R&D sector on the other hand. Labour demand from the final sector is obtained by aggre-
gating individual firms demand for for labour of skill level e and variety h, denoted by lh,ei,s,q,
is given by equation (17). Labour demand from the national R&D sector for highly skilled
labour of variety h from region q is denoted by lh,hi,qR&D and given by equation (18).
Prices and quantities adjust so as to obtain equilibrium on the labour market, i.e.:
lh,e,q =
S∑
s=1
Ns,q∑
i=1
lh,ei,s,q for e = lo,me
lh,hi,q =
S∑
s=1
Ns,q∑
i=1
lh,hii,s,q + l
h,hi,q
R&D
On the market for durable goods of region r, the firm v faces the following demand:
Dv,rF =
S∑
s=1
Ns,r · z
v,r
i,s,r
where zv,ri,s,r is specified by equation (16). The price setting rule (24) ensures that supply
equals demand so that
zv,r = D
v,r
F
Finally, the demand for designs addressed to the R&D sector corresponds to the number
of firms willing to operate in the durable goods sector
∑Rm
r=1N
z
r . As described in the next
section, this number depends on the price of designs, PJ,m, so that at equilibrium we have
Jrm =
Rm∑
r=1
Ar
φr
5.2. Financial markets
We select a saving driven closure rule where private saving is determined as a constant
fraction of households’ income (see equation 1). At equilibrium, (i) private saving must
finance private investment, public deficits and the deficit of the trade balance; and (ii)
returns on the three types of assets held by households must be equal. Finally, we assume
that financial markets are fully integrated at the level of the m countries.
Private investment in region r is the sum of investment of firms of the durable goods
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sector (i.e. the firms directly using capital as a production factor): PCr Ir =
∑Ar
v=1 P
C
r Iv,r =
Ar P
C
r Iv,r.
The trade balance deficit of each country (TBm) corresponds to the value of its exports
minus the value of its imports, TBm = Xm −Mm where:
Xm =
Rm∑
r=1
S−1∑
s=1
Ns,r∑
i=1
τS,r,R pi,s,r c
i,s,r
R (27)
Mm =
Rm∑
r=1
Hr∑
h=1
τS,R,r pS,R c
S,R
h,r (28)
The trade balance of the domestic economy then corresponds to the sum of the national
trade balances with respect to the rest of the world:
TB =
M∑
m=1
TBm
We therefore have
S =
R−1∑
r=1
Hr∑
h=1
Sh,r =
R−1∑
r=1
Ar P
C
r Ir +
M∑
m=1
Dm + TB
Finally, arbitrage on the financial markets equalises net returns on financial assets. The
net return for holding capital in firm v, r is (rkv,r−δK)P
C
r +(1−δK)∆P
C
r . Firms are symmetric
and hence rkv,r = r
k
r for all v. Letting rG,m denote the return on government bonds of country
m and rF the return on foreign bonds, the arbitrage condition is
(rkr − δK)P
C
r + (1− δK)∆P
C
r = rG,m = rF
for allm = 1 . . .M and for all r = 1 . . .R−1. Note that the required gross return for physical
capital rkr P
C
r is higher in regions where the price of capital P
C
r is high. This reflects the fact
that depreciation incurs a higher financial loss when the resources needed to acquire capital
are more important, which is for instance the case in remote regions.
Households hold assets in proportion to their saving. The accumulation of assets by
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household h, q is then described by the following law of motions:
∆Bk,v,rh,q =
Sh,q
S
∆av,r
∆BG,mh,q =
Sh,q
S
Dm
∆BFh,q =
Sh,q
S
TB
where S =
∑R−1
q=1
∑Hq
h=1 Sh,q corresponds to the total savings of domestic households.
6. Location and spatial equilibrium
6.1. Why does space matter in RHOMOLO?
The model breaches a number of the conditions identified by Starrett (1978) for having
perfectly homogenous distribution of economic activity in space. In particular, agents and
factors of production are partly immobile, locations are not uniforms (because population
and accessibility varies from one regions to the other), the economy is open, there is imperfect
competition on product and labour markets and the introduction of knowledge spill-over
makes some markets incomplete. There are however two sets of elements without which
the issue of location and space would not exist in the model: the combination of trade cost
and increasing returns on the one hand, and the combination of knowledge spill-over and
localised externalities on the other hand.13
Both consumers and producers face positive trade costs for importing final/investment
goods and intermediate inputs. On the consumer side, trade costs enter the consumer price
index (6). On the producer side, trade costs enter the intermediate goods price index (12)
and the investment price index (similar to the consumer price index). However, departing
from the standard framework of the new economic geography literature, bilateral trade costs
between regions are assumed to be asymmetric and the internal trade costs to be positive.
Values for the inter-regional trade costs come from the data, instead of being calibrated or
proxied by distance (see Ivanova et al., 2011; Potters et al., 2013; Thissen et al., 2014, for
details).
Increasing returns to scale are introduced via fixed costs in firms production functions
(10) and (22). Following Venables (1996), they are made of part of the firms output. In
13See Di Comite and Kancs (2013) for a detailed description of agglomeration and dispersion forces and
mechanisms in RHOMOLO.
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contrast to trade costs, fixed costs is strictly speaking an exogenous variable rather than a
parameter. Nevertheless, they can be used to calibrate the model.
The combination of increasing returns, - preventing the endless division of the scale
of economic activities and hence the emergence of so-called backyard capitalism -, and of
transport cost, - without which the issue of space would be irrelevant -, makes access to
large markets a determinant of the firms performance. Access to large markets allows the
exploitation of economies of scale and hence increase profits. Location (close to a large
market) then becomes a decision variable.
Localised externalities enter RHOMOLO trough technological and knowledge spillovers
whose scope is assumed to be limited in space to the boundary of the region. Indeed,
localised externalities are region-specific and determine the relationship between the density
of workers and durable goods firms in a region on the one hand and the performance of the
local durable goods sector and hence the productivity of factors on the other hand. When
the number of durable goods firms increases in one region,the total productivity of factors
used in the industry also increases. This leads to an increase in the number of firms in the
final goods sector which in turn increases demand for durable goods and hence profits in
the durable goods sector. This type of Marshallian externality (see for instance Marshall
(1890) or Scitovsky (1954)) implies that R&D and technological progress tends to be spatially
concentrated in a limited number of places.
6.2. Spatial equilibrium
In the short run, pure profit may exist. However, in the long run, this will trigger the
entry of new firms on the market which will decrease the demand addressed to each firm and
hence reduce the level of profit.14 This process takes place until pure profit is completely
exhausted. The profit of firm i, s, r reads
pii,s,r = pi,s,rXi,s,r − P
y
i,s,r yi,s,r −
S∑
u=1
P ur X
u
i,s,r − P
y
i,s,r FCr
= pi,s,rXi,s,r − P
y
i,s,rXi,s,r −
S∑
u=1
au−1s P
u
r Xi,s,r − P
y
i,s,r FCr (29)
14The expressions describing total demand are relatively complicated but one can indeed show that it is
a decreasing function of the number of firms. In the simple case where there is only one sector and one
region, the demand addressed to a particular firm by consumers is 1/N · I/p where I is the income devoted
to consumption
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Pure profit is equal to zero when the price equals average cost, i.e.
0 = pi,s,r − P
y
i,s,r −
S∑
u=1
au−1s P
u
r − P
y
i,s,r FCr/Xi,s,r (30)
Using the price setting rule (11), one obtains the level of production corresponding to
zero profit:
X∗i,s,r =
P yi,s,r FCr
1−θ
θ
[
P yi,s,r −
∑S
u=1 a
u
s
−1 P ur
]
The same mechanism applies to the durable goods sector. For each firm of the sector,
pure profit is exhausted when demand is such that the price it sets is equal to average cost:
pv,r = r
k
v,r P
C
r + PJ,m/zv,r + FCv,r/zv,r
By equation (24), the price is a mark-up over marginal cost which, combined to the
expression above, gives the production level which annihilates pure profit:
z∗v,r =
PJ,m + FCv,r
1−ρ
ρ
[
rkv,r P
C
r
]
We then have a system of s×r equations of the type X∗i,s,r = D
i,s,r
H +D
i,s,r
F +D
i,s,r
K +D
i,s,r
G
plus r equations z∗v,r = D
v,r
F with s×r+ r unknowns corresponding to the long term number
of firms in each sector and in each region, N∗s,r and A
∗
r .
Transition to the long term number of firms is not immediate and is described by the
following law of motion, which is assumed to be the same in every region and sector: ∆N =
λ · (N − N∗). The number of firms in each region determines the spatial distribution of
economic activity in model. It is fully endogenous and incorporates several agglomeration
and dispersion forces.
6.3. Agglomeration and dispersion forces
Four effects drive the mechanics of endogenous agglomeration and dispersion of economic
agents in RHOMOLO: the market access effect, the price index effect, the market crowding
effect and the the localised externalities effect.
The market access effect is based on the fact that, due to the presence of increasing
returns and transport costs, firms in large/central regions tend to have higher profits than
firms in small/peripheral regions. Firms therefore prefer to locate in large/central regions
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and export to small/peripheral regions. Due to positive trade costs, the demand for a
region’s output increases with its relative accessibility and its economic size. This can be
seen in equations (5), (15), (23) and (26), according to which total demand addressed to firm
i, s, r, and hence its profit decreases with trade costs, τs,r,q, decrease with an elasticity
1
1−θ
.
The weighted average trade costs can be lower either due to large internal market (low value
of τs,r,r) or due to good accessibility of/central location of a region (low value of < τs,r,q), or
both.
The profitability of firms facing larger demand is enhanced due to the existence of in-
creasing returns, as growth in output reduces the average production costs. This can be
seen by combining equations (9), (10) and (29), according to which an increase in output,
Xi,s,r, reduces the share of fixed costs in average costs, and hence increases the firm’s profit.
The price index effect describes the impact of firms’ location and trade costs on the cost of
intermediate inputs and of durable goods for producers of final demand goods. This follows
the vertical linkage framework of Venables (1996). Large/central regions with more firms
import a narrower range of products, which reduces trade costs. Therefore, intermediate
inputs are less expensive in large/central regions than in small/peripheral regions. This
can be seen in the intermediate inputs price index (12) which decreases in trade costs with
elasticity 1. This suggests that that total trade costs,
∑R
r=1 τs,r,q, and hence the cost of
production is lower in large/central regions. Moreover, production costs are also lower
in regions with a large number of durable goods firms. Indeed, one easily checks that the
durable goods price index (13) decreases with the number of durable goods firms Ar. Because
of lower production cost, firms purchasing intermediate inputs and using durable goods as
a factor of production would prefer to locate in large/central regions.
The market crowding effect capture the fact that, because of higher competition for input
and output markets, firms prefer to locate in small/peripheral regions with fewer competitors
than in large/central regions where competition is fiercer. Indeed, when the number of firms
in large/central regions increases consumption of differentiated goods is fragmented over a
larger number of varieties, implying that each firm’s output and profit decreases. Given that
the entry of new firms has a negative effect on profitability of incumbents in large/central
regions, this market crowding effect works as a dispersion force.
The effect of competition on output markets can be seen in equations (5) and (6), ac-
cording to which the demand of output produced by firm i, s, r is decreasing in the number
of final goods firms. Lower output, and hence profit, gives the incentive to firms to move
away from large/central regions to small/peripheral regions with fewer competitors.
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The effect of competition on input markets works through prices of spatially immobile pro-
duction factors, namely labour and durable goods. Agglomeration of firms in large/central
regions bids up prices for such production factors which reduces the incentive to locate in
places where the number of firms is large.
The local externalities effect works through the probability to succeed in transforming
designs into a new production process, φr, which depends on the pre-existing regional stock
of durable goods firms, Ar, and the stock of human capital, HCr (see equation 21). In
particular, the probability to operationalise a new design is higher in regions where the
number of durable goods firms is large. As a result, the accumulation of technology is
facilitated in regions largely endowed with durable goods firms, creating the conditions for
R&D and technological progress to agglomerate in places where the stock of knowledge and
of technology is already large.
The table below summarises the endogenous location mechanisms which drive the geo-
graphical distribution of final goods and durable goods firms and foster their agglomeration
or dispersion in space.
Table 2: Agglomeration and dispersion in RHOMOLO
Final goods firms durable goods firms
Market access effect ⇑ ⇑
Price index effect ⇑
Market crowding effect ⇓ ⇓
Local externalities effect ⇑ ⇑
Note: ⇑ denotes agglomeration, ⇓ denotes dispersion.
Note that the agglomerations of final goods and of durable goods firms reinforce each
other. A large number of final goods firms means a large market for durable goods firms
which enhances the market access effect for the durable goods sector. A large number of
durable goods firms implies that a large number of varieties of durable goods are available
for final goods firms which enhances the price index effect for the final goods sector.
7. Conclusion
Cohesion policy shifts the spatial equilibrium at the regional level within the EU and the
Member States by increasing the capacity for growth in the regions that are lagging behind
and to some extent also by mobilising the unused capacity in other regions. It does so by
supporting investments in the trans-European infrastructure networks connecting the regions
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as well as by stimulating measures fostering the development of human resources, research
and innovation and, in general, improving the standard of living and attractiveness of the
regions. Although the room for public funding and redistribution is limited by balanced
budget requirements, the impact on the less developed regions can be very substantial if the
forces of agglomeration and dispersion of economic activity, as they are laid out in the New
Economic Geography literature, are taken into account.
This paper presents a spatial general equilibrium framework in which the interplay of
agglomeration and dispersion forces, including the ones set in motion by cohesion policy
can be analysed in a novel and theoretically consistent way, including the impact in the net
contributing Member States. Particular attention is paid to income and capital movements
within and between regions that are generated by the stimulus to the regions. This will
allow an assessment of the feedback to the Member States and regions and the possibility
that in the longer run they will all benefit from the additional growth that is generated.
The paper carefully analyses the implications of cohesion policy interventions on the
spatial equilibrium in terms of income and employment. In doing so, it sheds new light on
how the success of cohesion policy can be measured. The paper recognises the limitations
of a comparative static approach and advocates further work and extensions of the model
and its potential use in the direction of dynamics, in particular by incorporating the results
of research on long-term productivity developments and migration between regions.
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